Traditionally, research focusing on the design of routing and staffing policies for service systems has modeled servers as having fixed (possibly heterogeneous) service rates. However, service systems are generally staffed by people who respond to workload incentives; that is, how hard a person works can depend both on how much work there is, and how the work is divided between the people responsible for it. In a service system, the routing and staffing policies control such workload incentives, and so they impact the rate at which servers work. We investigate the consequences of this observation when modeling service system performance in the context of the M /M /N queue, which is the canonical model for large service systems. We begin by presenting a model for "strategic" servers that choose their service rate, in which there is a tradeoff between an "effort cost" and a "value of idleness": faster service rates require more exertion of effort, but also lead to more idle time.
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economically optimal staffing policy in the strategic setting must staff servers in excess of square-root staffing, on the order of the arrival rate, highlighting that strategic behavior forces the system into a Quality Driven (QD) regime instead.
Finally, we study the impact of strategic servers on the design of dispatch policies in multi-server service systems. The most commonly proposed policies include Fastest Server First (FSF), which dispatches arrivals to the fastest idle server, Longest Idle Server First (LISF), which dispatches arrivals to the server that has been idle the longest, and Random, which dispatches arrivals to idle servers uniformly. When servers are not strategic, FSF is the natural (if not always optimal) choice for reducing mean response time. However, when servers are strategic, we prove that FSF has no symmetric equilibria. Further, we prove that LISF, a commonly suggested policy for call centers due to its fairness properties, has the same, unique, symmetric equilibrium as Random. In fact, we prove that there is a large policy-space collapse -all "idletime-order-based" routing policies are equivalent in a very strong sense. Intuitively, Slowest Server First (SSF) might appear to be a good dispatching policy, as it incentivizes servers to work fast; however, we prove that, like FSF, SSF has no symmetric equilibria. Nevertheless, by "softening" the bias placed by SSF toward slow servers, we identify policies that are guaranteed to have unique symmetric equilibria and provide lower equilibrium mean response times than LISF and Random.
